

Rethinking Religious Gender Differences: The Case of Elite Women

Orestes P. Hastings*

University of California, Berkeley

D. Michael Lindsay

Gordon College

Decades of research has suggested that women are much more religious than men. Yet our survey of 107 women and 362 men who are alumni of the White House Fellows program finds that elite women are less likely than elite men to report religion as being important to their lives. When focusing on the fellows who are women, we find that obtaining a graduate degree from a top university, being highly committed to one's work, and being recognized for success are all associated with a lower likelihood of rating religion as important. We elucidate some of these findings with analyses of in-depth interviews. We suggest that aspiring women may not benefit from religion the same way men do and that religion often fails to provide similar levels of support for elite women as for elite men. We conclude by arguing for finer-grained measures of professional accomplishment and social standing to better understand gender differences in religion.

Key words: elites; gender differences; work; family; White House Fellows.

Over the last few decades, the American elite—those in senior leadership positions within major institutions of American society (Giddens 1973; Mills 1956; Moore 1979)¹—has become more heterogeneous. Yet although it has

**Direct correspondence to Orestes P. Hastings, Department of Sociology, University of California, 410 Barrows Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA. E-mail: ophastings@berkeley.edu.*

¹Others have defined “elite” as a social class or by membership in a selective club (Baltzell 1953; Broad 1996). Regardless, we agree with Scott’s (2008) conclusion that “Elites are analytically distinguishable from social classes and status groups, no matter how entwined they may be in real situations” (34) and therefore use organizational and social positions as the principal means of defining the term.

© The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Association for the Sociology of Religion. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.

become easier for women to enter into elite ranks (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 2006), the number of women in elite positions remains relatively small (Domhoff 2006). Over the same span of time, research has confirmed a long-standing finding that women are more religious than men (for examples, see Freese 2004; Stark 2002; Walter and Davie 1998; for reviews, see Sherkat and Ellison 1999; Walter 1990; for an alternative perspective, see Sullins 2006). However, up to this point, no study has examined whether these religious gender differences are also found among elites.

Although we know the religious lives of American elites do not necessarily resemble those of the general public (Ecklund 2010; Lindsay 2007) and elites are often perceived as being less religious (Berger et al. 2008), we know very little about variations in religion *within* this important population. Unfortunately, access to elites is usually difficult to obtain, so they have been hard to study in significant numbers (Zuckerman 1972).² Thus, despite the tremendous influence of elites, surprisingly little research has been conducted on them, particularly with respect to the role of religion in their lives (Smith 2008).

We studied a subpopulation of elites by approaching them within the context of a single program: The White House Fellows program—one of America's most prestigious fellowships for early-career leaders. The program brings together a diverse group who later rise to elite ranks, and its alumni include some of the top leaders in business, academia, the military, law, science, politics, and the media. A survey we conducted of the program's alumni reveals that the Fellowship's women are actually *less likely* than the men to value religion as important in their lives (62 percent compared with 71 percent of men). Given this unexpected finding, in this article, we focus on how family and career structure, personality, and status explain the variation among elite women in who considers religion to be unimportant. We then discuss what our findings suggest about the place of religion in elite quarters and about religious gender differences more broadly. Through our analyses and discussion, we aim to contribute to research and theory on gender differences among elites, religion among elites, and gender differences in religion.

ELITE WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES

The last in-depth comprehensive study of very senior American leaders was the American Leadership Study (ALS) conducted by Columbia University's Bureau of Applied Social Research in 1971 and 1972, but only 25 of the 545

²Though researchers have found it a little easier to access elites in contexts outside the United States, both elite life and religion are very different in the United States than elsewhere.

leaders interviewed were women (Moore 1988).³ Another 1970s study found that women occupied less than 5 percent of the more than 7,000 leadership positions analyzed among the business, legal, nonprofit, and government sectors in the United States (Dye and Strickland 1982). Even now, relatively few women can be found in positions of institutional leadership (Domhoff 2006). As a result, in the few studies of American elites, only a fraction of those researched have been women.

However, the differences between elite men and women that we know from these studies are worth noting. Dye and Strickland (1982) found that although the majority of the women in their study were married and had children, the women were still significantly less likely than the men to have children. A recent study of elite U.S. scientists found similar results (Ecklund 2010). Studies of the business sector have shown how tokenism and gender stereotypes (e.g., the role of motherhood) make it more difficult for women to flourish and rise in the ranks of corporations (Ghiloni 1987; Kanter 1977; Turco 2010).

Several studies have focused on political elites. Lawless and Fox (2005) concluded that few women run for political office because they have lower self-confidence than similarly qualified men and receive less encouragement to pursue election. Martin (1989) examined cabinet and subcabinet posts, finding that women were generally younger than men when appointed, were more likely to have a background in law (compared with business for men), and tended to be promoted by transfer to a different department (whereas men were more likely to rise in rank within departments). Finally, in a cross-national study of policy-making elites in the United States, West Germany, and Australia, Moore (1988) found that elite women tended to be of higher social origins than their male counterparts, and they were less likely to be married and to have children. Moreover, even when women achieved elite positions, they lacked the informal networks of power that men enjoyed and thus remained “outsiders on the inside” (582).

THE GENDERED MAKEUP OF AMERICAN RELIGION

Though no study has specifically addressed religious gender differences among elites, we can consider how explanations about religious gender differences in the general population may apply to elites. We know that studies have frequently found that women are more religious than men. Miller and Stark (2002) go so far as to declare an “apparently ‘universal’ gender difference in religious commitment” (1399). Using data from the World Values Survey, Stark (2002) found that women were more religious than men in 49 different countries. But

³The ALS included informants from *Fortune* 500 industrial corporations and *Fortune* 300 nonindustrial corporations; holders of large fortunes; heads of labor unions, political parties, voluntary organizations, and mass media; members of Congress; and federal political appointees.

not everyone agrees. For example, Sullins (2006) found that when distinguishing “affective religiousness” (personal piety, importance of religion) from “active religiousness” (organizational involvement such as church attendance), women in one-third of the countries sampled scored no higher than the men in active religiousness. Nevertheless, Sullins concluded, the gender divide on religious outcomes does persist within the United States. American women are more religious than men on both the affective- and active-religion indicators used from the World Values Survey. Previous studies of religiosity among women provide three explanations for the variation in religiosity among women: family and career structure, personality, and social status. In the following sections, we describe each of these explanations and offer hypotheses to test in our analyses.

Family and Career Structure

Several explanations exist on why family and career structure affects the religiosity of women. Having more children generally increases religious participation among the general population (Argue et al. 1999; Petts 2007; Wuthnow 2007), and since women are usually more involved with child-rearing, they may attend religious services more frequently than men (though this may be changing; see Edgell 2006) because of the activities offered there for their children. Women may also be more religiously engaged because they see their children’s religious education as important and take responsibility for it (Levitt 1995). Women are often more active than men in civic life (Putnam 2000), and civic and religious activities frequently intersect. It has also been suggested that women are more religious because they work less outside the home and thus have more time (de Vaus and McAllister 1987; Iannaccone 1990). However, other research finds that career women are just as religious as women who do not work outside the home for pay (Cornwall 1988). Still, it follows that family structure and career commitments may affect the religious lives of elite women.

Hypothesis 1: Nontraditional family lives and high career commitments are associated with elite women considering religion to be less important.

Personality

Another explanation suggests that personality explains the gender difference—that is, women are more likely than men to be gentle, submissive, and nurturing, all of which may be more congruent with religion (Argyle and Beit-Hallahami 1975; Beit-Hallahami 1997). The primary explanation of the cause of these differences in personality is socialization: women are raised to exhibit personality traits that make religious acceptance and commitment more likely (Suziedalis and Potvin 1981). Furthermore, the argument goes that traditional religious institutions reinforce the legitimacy of this type of differential socialization (Chalfant et al. 1994).

Some have criticized the general socialization explanation for the lack of empirical support (Miller and Stark 2002; Sullins 2006). However, the cause of

these differences in personality is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, we suggest that if differences in personality—however they may arise—explain part of the gender differences in religion, then differences in personality may also explain variations among women in the importance of religion. If the personality traits of elite women controvert the typical personality traits expected among women, then we expect to also find a diminished emphasis on the role of religion in their lives.

We also expect that the contribution of less gentle, submissive, and nurturing personality traits toward explaining the unimportance of religion to be even *greater* for women and than men, since such personality traits in women would also defy gendered expectations within some religious traditions. Though the roles for men and women vary in different religious traditions, many traditions—including Roman Catholicism, conservative Protestantism, and Islam—limit the leadership of women, particularly within a formal context. An analysis of Christian denominations in the United States found that the adoption of women’s ordination depended on a variety of internal characteristics and external pressures (Chaves 1996). Some women leave religious traditions that limit their roles (Stocks 1997), but other women find empowerment in conservative ideologies (Manning 1999; Read and Bartkowski 2000). Still others can be dissatisfied with this aspect of their tradition, yet remain committed through a more individualistic religious identity. Examples of this have been observed among both Orthodox Jews in Israel (Avishai 2008) and Roman Catholics in the United States (Ecklund 2005). Nevertheless, women whose personality traits are in conflict with institutional religious practices and beliefs may reject or avoid religion. This fits, for example, with Sherkat’s (2002) explanation of why lesbians are less religious than gay men. Sherkat argues that because lesbians frequently reject traditional patriarchy, they will invariably be more likely to reject religion as well. Similarly, elite women whose personality traits controvert traditional gender roles may consider religion to be an unimportant part of their lives.

Hypothesis 2: Possessing personality traits that differ from traditional stereotypes about women is associated with elite women considering religion to be less important.

Social Status

Status is generally associated with a negative impact on traditional measures of religious belief (Sherkat and Ellison 1999). We expect this to be especially true in the case of elite women for two reasons: first, even though religious traditions have often limited the leadership roles of women, other scholars have noted that the religious sector has experienced what some refer to as a “feminization” process. For instance, Brown (2001) described how nineteenth-century Great Britain experienced a cultural shift whereby men, who once dominated church life, were instead increasingly chastened by religious leaders; religious energy was directed, “no longer [toward] the taming of the Elizabethan shrew but in the bridling of the Victorian rake, drunkard, gambler, and abuser” (88). A

spiritual sensibility resulted that “pietised femininity” (59). A similar shift has been observed within the United States (Shiels 1981). With the rise of second-wave feminism beginning in the 1960s (Roth 2004), women moved from being merely churchgoers and synagogue attenders to ordained leaders within Mainline Protestantism (Purvis 1995) and Reform Judaism (Nadell 2009), among other traditions. If religion is seen as “feminine,” it may follow that women who spend their professional lives in a predominately male arena may put less emphasis on their religious beliefs. We know that elite aspirants (whom Bourdieu calls *parvenus*) can adjust their lives to conform to the social norms of established elites (Bourdieu 1984) and also that women are relative newcomers to the elite (Domhoff 2006; Moore 1998). Thus, women rising through the elite ranks may be especially likely to conform to the perceived norms of a once male-dominated elite. For example, Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (2006) describe how women attempt to assimilate to the existing culture among business leaders, such as by taking up golf or cigarettes.

Second, a negative impact of status on the importance of religion conforms with the risk-aversion explanation of religious gender differences in the general population. According to this theory, lack of religious commitment entails a potential loss of supernatural rewards; hence men, who have a greater propensity toward risky behavior, are more likely to take this risk and eschew religious commitment in their lives (Collett and Lizardo 2009; Miller and Hoffmann 1995; Miller and Stark 2002; Stark 2002). At the elite level, however, risk aversion could suggest the opposite outcomes. If women see themselves as newcomers to elite ranks, they may consider it risky embrace religion because it might be perceived as “feminine” and because elites are often considered less religious than nonelites. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to measure risk aversion directly, so we cannot test a hypothesis of how variations in risk aversion for elite women is associated with the importance of the religion. However, we expect that women who have risen the highest through the elite ranks will be the most likely to conform to the perceived norms by not making religion an important part of their lives.

Hypothesis 3: Increased prominence and higher social status within elite ranks are associated with elite women considering religion to be less important.

DATA FOR AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION: THE WHITE HOUSE FELLOWS

Origins, Activities, and Alumni of the Program

Our data come from the first systematic analysis of the White House Fellows program. This explicitly nonpartisan program began in 1965 to expose highly qualified young Americans to the inner workings of the federal government. Borne out of President Johnson’s concern with the disaffection he saw among American youth toward the federal government, the program aimed to provide a select few with a first-class educational program and create a “reservoir of

able men and women” who might later serve in senior positions of government or return to their original sectors and industries as better civic leaders (O’Toole 1995).

Every year, 11–19 fellows are chosen by a presidentially appointed commission from a variety of professional fields such as the military, academia, business, law, medicine, and nonprofit life. Fellows spend their year as senior aides to top government officials such as the president, the first lady, the vice president, a cabinet secretary, or a member of the White House staff. Fellows participate in an educational program consisting of several week-long trips to explore policy issues and twice-a-week seminars that take the form of round-table discussions with prominent leaders, including the president, cabinet secretaries, Supreme Court justices, and leaders in business and the nonprofit sectors. Though the fellowship occurs early in one’s career (at the time of our study, the average age of fellows was 32, and only five were older than 40); the program’s alumni constitute a veritable “Who’s Who” of the American elite in virtually every segment of society. In government, this includes many members of Congress, cabinet secretaries, the director of national intelligence, and dozens of Navy admirals and Army generals. In business, former fellows include the CEOs or presidents of JCPenney, Ford, CNN, Levi Strauss, Tenneco, and Travelocity, to name just a few.

Women were absent in the program’s inaugural class of fellows, but they have been represented in every subsequent class. Altogether, 24 percent have been women. Notables include former NBC Chair Jane Cahill Pfeiffer (the first female White House fellow), Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao, U.S. Representative Lynn Schenk, Travelocity CEO Michelle Peluso, and Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Doris Kearns Goodwin.

The White House Fellows Project

In the fall of 2008, we conducted a 72-question survey of all former White House Fellows, administered by the National Opinion Research Center, that explored three areas: the fellows’ backgrounds before the fellowship; how the fellowship experience has affected their lives both personally and professionally; and how the fellows’ backgrounds, attitudes, and experiences compare with those of the general population. The survey was mailed along with a letter on White House stationery from the program director urging fellows to participate. Respondents also had the option of completing the questionnaire online or via telephone, and a 10-dollar cash incentive was included with the survey packet.⁴

⁴Data from all three modes of participation (mail, online, phone) were combined by the National Opinion Research Center. Hence, only the combined data set was analyzed by the authors. One of the authors has previous experience studying elites and previously found that using incentives with elites work as way of generating attention, but not as compensation for their time. (Another tactic we used to garner attention was sending the surveys via FedEx.) Research on incentives has not addressed how elites might respond differently to them.

With this set of strategies, we achieved a 78 percent response rate among the program's living alumni at that time ($N = 475$).⁵ We also collected additional variables—including the fellows' education and professional and voluntary positions—using biographical sketches from the brochures of each class of fellows and online databases such as Marquis Who's Who and Prospect Research Online.⁶


We supplement these quantitative data with analyses from 100 face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with White House fellows between 2008 and 2010 (a full list is available from the authors). The interviews (with 21 women and 79 men) covered a variety of topics, but each informant was asked, "How important is religion in your own life?" and/or "When making a big decision, what sources of wisdom do you turn to?" The interviewer often probed any spiritual or religious references in response to this question, and some informants used this part of the interview to discuss the salience of religion (or the lack thereof) in their lives.

We pursued demographic heterogeneity by requesting interviews with informants from different sectors (including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government; the business and nonprofit sectors; and the military) and from every presidential administration. Even more diversity was achieved by requesting, whenever possible, interviews with fellows who are women or members of other underrepresented groups among the American elite. Within our demographically stratified categories, we first approached subjects who were especially well known. Ninety-one percent of the interview requests were granted. Over 150 hours of interviews were transcribed and coded (using ATLAS.ti) by our research team through an iterative process. After the team finished using a particular set of analytic codes for the entire set of interview transcripts, the group met together and discussed common findings and themes. We then decided on a new set of codes (some being fine-tuned versions of previous codes and others entirely new) and began the process of recoding the transcripts, which were randomly assigned to team members. Through this iterative process, every transcript was coded at least four times. To test for intercoder reliability, about 5 percent of the interviews were coded by a second team member during each iteration.

⁵This response rate is comparable to some of the best nationally representative surveys. By contrast, a study conducted in 2011 of another group of elites—in this case, a survey of university and college presidents conducted by the Pew Forum in association with the *Chronicle of Higher Education*—achieved only a 32 percent response rate (Pew Research Center 2011).

⁶Much of the data gathered from online sources were recorded as nominal variables (e.g., hometown, schools attended, positions, held, charities donated to). While these nominal variables added nuance to our understanding of specific individuals, they could not be used in our regression analyses.

FIGURE 1. Response to “How Important Is Religion in Your Own Life?” for White House Fellows by Gender (Source: White House Fellows Project, 2008).



METHODS

Measures

Our dependent variable is derived from the survey question “How important is religion in your own life?” Respondents could answer “Not at all important,” “Not very important,” “Fairly important,” or “Very important.” We are most interested in why some elite women do not consider religion to be important, so we collapse these responses for binary logistic regression into the dichotomous variable “Not Important” (=1 for “Not at all important” or “Not very important”). A distribution to our original question for men and women is presented in figure 1.⁷ Overall, 31 percent of respondents consider religion to be unimportant in their lives.

Previous research suggests that religious commitment is affected by race/ethnicity (Chatters et al. 1999; Ellison and Sherkat 1990), age (Argue et al. 1999; Hout and Greeley 1987), and education (Hoge and Roozen 1979; Hout and Greeley 1987), so we include these as controls. The White House fellows are

⁷Other coding strategies were also considered. With only four categories, we prefer to not use linear regression which assumes a continuous dependent variable. We prefer a binary logistic regression over ordered logistic regression for two reasons. First, we think the conceptual gap between “Not very important” to “Fairly important” is probably larger than the gap between other adjacent categories on our scale, which could violate the proportional odds assumption. Second, we believe using binary logistic regression is easier to interpret, making the results more useful to our readers. We preformed equivalent models with ordered logistic and linear regression to the models presented in table 2 and found comparable results. These additional results are available from the authors upon request.

a highly educated population (96 percent have earned a graduate degree), so we use a more discriminating education indicator, which is if the fellow attended an elite university—that is, either a top-25 national university (as ranked in 2009 by *U.S. News & World Report*) or a U.S. military academy.⁸ We also measure the educational impact of the Fellowship itself by creating a dummy variable from survey responses to the question, “How important was the Fellowship to your development as a leader?” comparing those who chose “Very important” with all others.

To evaluate the role of family structure for hypothesis 1, we employ measures of current marital status and the fellow’s number of children. To measure high commitment to one’s work, we use a measure of whether she rates career and work as “Very important.”

Unfortunately, our survey contained few measures of personality traits that we expect to vary significantly by gender to test hypothesis 2. The measures we use are the views about success and social trust (each on a five-point Likert scale from “Completely disagree” to “Completely agree”). Our measure of perceptions of success is the response to the phrase “Most people who don’t succeed in life are just plain lazy.” The 1991 National Race and Politics Study found that women were less likely ($p < .01$) than men to agree with this statement. Our measure of social trust is the response to the phrase “Most people are trustworthy.” Studies have found that women are slightly more trusting than men (*Feingold 1994*), so we expect that elite women who are more trusting of others will be more likely to consider religion to be important.⁹ We recognize that these measures cover only a subset of personality traits that vary by gender, and possible consequences of this limitation are discussed at the end of this article.

To test hypothesis 3, we measure public prominence and elite status by including dummy variables for appearing in *Marquis Who’s Who* (one of the oldest and most recognized markers of elite distinction) and being elected to membership in an elite policy organization (such as the Council on Foreign Relations).

Some fellows left a few survey questions unanswered, and some ancillary data could not be gathered for every fellow. Our analyses are based on complete data for 63 percent of all women and 69 percent of all men who were White House fellows between 1965 and 2008. We found no major correlations between missing data and various categories (including career trajectory, family and educational backgrounds, and professional status) that could bias our results. Given this, we surmise that the findings reported here are generally trustworthy.

⁸Though not explored here, it is also possible that attending a military academy has the opposite effect on the importance of religion as attending another top-25 university.

⁹We also considered a link between trust and religion, but bivariate analyses of the full sample of men and women found no significant relationship ($p = .141$) between trust and religion.

Table 1 provides basic descriptive statistics on the major variables used in subsequent analyses; differences of means between men and women respondents are provided. We see that women are significantly more likely to be younger, nonwhite, and single, while men are more likely to have graduated from an elite undergraduate school, be married, have more children, have appeared in Marquis Who's Who, and to believe those who do not succeed are lazy. No significant differences exist between men and women in terms of elite graduate education, leadership development through the White House Fellowship, valuing one's career and work, trusting others, or being an elected member of a major policy organization.

Another survey question asked for religious preference, which was recoded into the categories of religious tradition suggested by Steensland et al. (2000),


TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics (Source: White House Fellows Project, 2008)

Dependent variable	Range	Mean for women (μ_W)	Mean for men (μ_M)	Probability $\mu_W = \mu_M$
Religion not important	0–1	0.39	0.30	
Demographics				
Age in years	30–79	51.86	56.65	†
White ^a	0–1	0.68	0.78	*
Black	0–1	0.17	0.10	†
Latino	0–1	0.06	0.06	
Other minority	0–1	0.08	0.05	
Education				
Elite undergraduate	0–1	0.52	0.60	
Elite graduate	0–1	0.65	0.65	
WHF developed leadership	0–1	0.64	0.70	
Family/Career				
Currently married	0–1	0.66	0.88	***
Number of children	0–10	1.41	2.42	***
Work very important	0–1	0.62	0.65	
Views/beliefs				
Failure is from laziness	1–5	1.75	2.10	*
People are trustworthy	1–5	3.88	3.95	
Status				
Policy organization	0–1	0.51	0.53	
Marquis Who's Who	0–1	0.22	0.46	***
N		95	328	

† $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed).

^aFor descriptive purposes, Black, Latino, and Other are shown as categories alongside White. For parsimony, the measure Nonwhite was used in the regression analyses.

FIGURE 2. Religious Affiliation of White House Fellows by Gender (Source: White House Fellows Project, 2008).



except that because “Black Protestant” contained only two cases, it was added to “Other.” Figure 2 displays the distribution of responses by religious category for men and women. Men are more likely than women to identify as Evangelical Protestant, Mainline Protestant, or Catholic, whereas women are more likely than men to identify as Jewish, Other, or None.

Plan of Analysis

Given our focus on elite women who do not consider religion to be an important part of their lives, we use binary logistic regression models to predict the *unimportance* of religion. In our first model, we include only age, race, and education as independent variables. In model 2, we add family and career measures to test hypothesis 1. In model 3, we add measures of two personality traits to test hypothesis 2. In model 4, we add measures of status and prominence to test hypothesis 3. Analyses using all cases (both men and women) produced few surprising results, but in Table A1, we present the results for men and women combined and for men only using the same variables as model 4. We also tried a variety of interaction effects to explore gender differences in models that included both men and women respondents. However, because of the relatively small study universe, we found no significant interaction effects in combined analyses.¹⁰ We therefore focus on interpreting the models with only the women. We note that because our survey provides us data for a single point in time, our

¹⁰While we would prefer to work with a much larger data set, these data represent the most complete, up-to-date data involving elite women and religious measures available. As others have shown (e.g., Cheng and Powell 2005), quantitative studies involving smaller number of cases can still yield important findings.

analyses only reveal *associations* between the importance of religion and the family structure, personality, and status of elite women. In our discussion of the results, we include relevant interview data that help us make sense of our findings. After discussing the final model, we present additional quotes from our interviews where White House Fellows discussed the role of religion in their lives.

RESULTS

We find that 38 percent of these elite women find religion unimportant in their lives, compared with 29 percent of the men ($N = 469$, $\chi^2 = 3.134$, $p = .077$). Though the Pearson's χ^2 test shows only a marginally statistically significant difference from the standard null hypothesis of no difference between men and women, we believe that this result is noteworthy because, as we discussed the preceding sections, previous research has found (and often assumed) that women are *more* religious than men. Our models focus on explaining the variation in considering religion unimportant among elite women, and our results are presented in table 2.

Demographics and Education

Model 1 includes only demographic and education measures. In a regression (not shown) that included measures for different races/ethnicities, we found no significant results, so, for parsimony, we include only the variable for nonwhite in our models. Education plays a significant role in predicting the unimportance of religion for women. We find that an elite undergraduate education matters little, but women who obtain a graduate degree at a top university are four times more likely than women who did not to consider religion unimportant in their lives.¹¹ We are also interested in the formal and informal education that specifically occurs through the White House Fellowship. Fellows learn through their assigned position as an aide to a senior White House official, through their observations of the inner workings of government, and through the educational program designed for the fellows. Two core components shape this educational program: domestic- and foreign-policy trips, and biweekly seminars with distinguished leaders. And even though the White House Fellowship is nonsectarian,

¹¹We also considered the possibility that women, who more often go to law school, might be studying humanities and social sciences that challenge religious values more than men, who more often go to business school. We do not have data on undergraduate major to test this directly, but we analyzed the professional degrees the fellows earned. We created a variable "JD" (=1 if they have a JD, 0 otherwise) and "MBA" (=1 if they have an MBA, 0 otherwise). When we put these in our model, neither variable was significant in the case of all fellows or in the case of women. In other words, earning a JD or MBA does not mean someone is any more or less likely to consider religion unimportant. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

TABLE 2 Odds Ratios and Standard Errors from Logistic Regression on Religion as Unimportant among Female White House Fellows (N = 95) (Source: White House Fellows Project, 2008)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Age	1.005 (0.022)	1.018 (0.024)	1.023 (0.025)	0.996 (0.027)
Nonwhite	.944 (0.465)	0.911 (0.491)	0.974 (0.541)	0.929 (0.554)
Elite education				
Undergraduate	0.502 (0.268)	0.497 (0.279)	0.456 (0.268)	0.574 (0.348)
Graduate	3.844 (2.148)*	4.970 (3.140)*	5.977 (3.950)**	5.475 (3.690)*
WHF developed leadership	0.442 (0.206) [†]	0.161 (0.110)**	0.147 (0.106)**	0.075 (0.062)**
Family/career				
Currently married		1.648 (0.885)	1.706 (0.975)	1.950 (1.184)
Number of children		0.860 (0.175)	0.867 (0.186)	0.796 (0.178)
Work is very important		5.813 (4.056)*	7.850 (5.909)**	8.954 (7.049)**
Views/attitudes				
Failure is from laziness			1.440 (0.405)	1.742 (0.537) [†]
People are trustworthy			0.582 (0.172) [†]	0.578 (0.171) [†]
Status/prominence				
Policy organization				2.747 (1.658) [†]
Marquis Who's Who				4.380 (3.221)*
-2 log-likelihood	115.88	107.36	102.42	95.19
Pseudo-R ² (Nagelkerke)	0.088	0.155	0.194	0.251

[†] $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

religious influences inevitably seep into the program's educational offerings. For example, several times during the program's 45-year history, fellows have traveled to Israel and to Arab countries to explore the intersection of religion and public policy. In our interviews, a number of male fellows spoke about the religious significance of such trips. David Neuman, a Hollywood executive, talked about a trip his class made to the Middle East in 1984:

On the visas that we had to fill out, you had to declare your religion, which was quite extraordinary. So I was very sensitive and aware of not only my Jewishness but the fact that [our hosts in Arab countries] were aware of it as well. . . . In Saudi Arabia especially . . . you could sense that there was hostility not towards me personally, but a lot of hostility towards Israel, and I felt this sense of identification.

It was the first time I'd ever been anywhere where I'd really felt the sensitivity about [my religion], where I thought, "Oh, I feel self-conscious about this." But . . . crossing the Allenby Bridge from Jordan into Israel was extraordinary for me, and seeing a little Israeli flag there. [It was] very emotional to experience that.¹²

Other fellows described interactions with religious leaders in Africa, Asia, South America, and across the United States. A number of classes spent time at the Vatican, and the extensive travel affords opportunities for fellows to discuss their own religious views in light of policy debates, personal encounters with world leaders, and current events. The off-the-record seminars with notable leaders afford fellows the opportunity to interact with various religious and spiritual leaders, including, at various points in the history's program, clergy members who join their own ranks by being selected as fellows.

Since religion is invariably part of the informal education that fellows receive, we are not surprised to find in model 1 that women who reported the fellowship greatly shaped their learning as a leader were significantly less likely to consider religion unimportant. The significance of this effect remains as additional measures are added in subsequent models, but the magnitude diminishes. Our survey analyses and interviews with fellows suggest that the education they receive about religion as a social phenomenon—in briefings for their policy trips, while interacting with religious leaders formally and informally, or by getting to know other fellows who are deeply religious—may shape their religious attitudes

¹²Interview with David Neuman, November 3, 2009 (Los Angeles, CA). Although names and titles are frequently omitted in sociological research, interview data from elites have greater meaning when we can acknowledge the informants who gave them. We designed a research protocol with our institution's review board that allowed us to quote interview informants by name. Informants had the option of answering questions off the record and could edit the transcript after the interview. Informants occasionally did speak off the record or ask that parts of the interview be removed, but none of the interview portions about the informant's religious lives were conducted off the record or edited significantly. Thus, we do not believe the use of informants' names affected the quality of the interview data on their religious lives.

in much the same way that such interactions may shape their political orientations over the course of their fellowship year.

Family Structure and Career

Model 2 introduces variables to test the Family and Career Structure hypothesis. Surprisingly, there are no significant effects in our models for being married or having children among the women.¹³ However, in a separate model (see table A1), we find that men having more children decreases the likelihood of them considering religion unimportant. In other words, the conventional wisdom about children increasing the importance of religion for American adults (Argue et al. 1999; Petts 2007; Wuthnow 2007) appears to apply to elite men but not elite women.

We also find that women who consider career and work to be very important are significantly more likely to consider religion unimportant. As model 2 shows, a woman who is career oriented is five times more likely to consider religion unimportant, and remarkably, by model 4, these odds increase to nearly nine times. This finding suggests a significant divide among the elite women in this study, one that is not replicated among the elite men. In fact, in qualitative interviews, the male informants reported being very open about their faith in the workplace, and many of them saw their religious lives as *helping* their careers. For example, Samuel Howard, an African American business leader in Nashville, stated, “The spiritual basis keeps me focused—it’s my underpinning.”¹⁴ Howard, a Baptist, continued, “If I have troubles [either personally or professionally], I go to the Bible. I’ll start reading.” For many men, faith was seen as a resource for their professional lives. Similar notions did not arise in any of the interviews with women. Even though women did not speak negatively about religion, we believe that the *absence* of religious discussion among the women is an important observation. These interview and survey results partially support hypothesis 1. Considering work as very important is associated with religion being unimportant. However, we find no association between marital status or having children with considering religion unimportant.

Personality

Model 3 tests hypothesis 2 by adding variables that measure personality traits. Among these elite women, we find modest support for hypothesis 2. A one-point increase on the Likert scale of agreeing “Most people can be trusted” corresponds to a marginally significant reduction in the likelihood that elite women consider religion to be unimportant in their personal lives. This result holds in model 4. In model 3, we find no significant relationship between the

¹³We did not test other forms of marital status (such as always single, divorced, or widowed), because there were too few cases in each of these categories ($N = 18, 9, \text{ and } 2$, respectively).

¹⁴Interview with Samuel Howard, October 9, 2009 (Nashville, TN).

unimportance of religion and believing “Most people who fail are just plain lazy,” but once controlling for status in model 4, this measure is marginally significant. The direction of coefficients in both models do support hypothesis 2—elite women are more likely consider religion unimportant if they believe most people who fail are lazy. This connects with the earlier finding about the career orientation of respondents, where we found that women who value hard work in their own lives are much more likely to regard religion as unimportant in their lives.¹⁵

Status and Prominence

Model 4 tests hypothesis 3 by adding two indicators of social status: election to at least one major policy organization (such as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission, or the Business Roundtable) and being profiled in Marquis Who’s Who. We find strong support for Hypothesis 3. A woman belonging to an elite policy organization is 2.7 times more likely to consider religion unimportant and being in Marquis Who’s Who is associated with being 4.3 times more likely to consider religion unimportant. In the full model, we find that status markers are significant factors among this elite population, and this model accounts for approximately 25 percent of the variance in the dependent variable.

Discussion of Religion in Interviews with White House Fellows

The relative unimportance of religion among women that emerges in the multivariate analyses appeared in the qualitative interviews as well. Unlike the women, many of the men interviewed were very open about their religious faith. For example, Clayton Christenson, a devout Mormon who holds an endowed chair at Harvard Business School, reported, “I pray every day that God will send me people who need help, who have been praying to him, so that I can be the means by which God answers their prayers.”¹⁶ Similar professions of faith emerged nearly a dozen times in interviews with other male fellows. Men reported regular worship attendance, reading religious books, and listening regularly to recorded talks by their favorite ministers. Even some nonreligious fellows expressed “spiritual” sentiments in the interviews.¹⁷ Kien Pham, who runs VietNamNet Media Group, said, “[My] spiritual life is important to me. . . . I’m not a regular churchgoer. I pray. I focus on the personal relationship with God.”¹⁸

¹⁵Many of the interview respondents for both men and women discussed the importance of hard work and of assistance (e.g., how much should one help one’s family). However, none of these discussions were connected to religion.

¹⁶Interview with Clayton Christenson, November 13, 2009 (Cambridge, MA).

¹⁷Though being “religious” and being “spiritual” are different, including among elites (Ecklund and Long 2011), these findings may extend directly to gender differences on spirituality.

¹⁸Interview with Kien Pham, October 23, 2009 (Washington, DC).

The women shared a very different perspective. When we asked about sources of wisdom in big decisions—a topic that often elicited religious responses from the male informants—the women typically talked about the role of other people, not religious sources of inspiration or guidance. For example, former Commissioner of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service Doris Meissner credited “the people around [me]. . . . It’s the people. It’s the relationships.”¹⁹ Similarly, federal judge M. Margaret McKeown, who sits on the ninth circuit for the U.S. Court of Appeals, responded by saying, “Well, my husband for one. And I’m a huge reader of biographies. I draw on some philosophers. I draw on people . . . friends and family.”²⁰ Women frequently related that religion played only a small role or even no role in their lives, but they did not share why. This finding merits further study in the future.

Jane Cahill Pfeiffer, the first woman to be chair of NBC, is an exception to this general trend. A practicing Catholic, Pfeiffer has also served on the board of the University of Notre Dame for many years. Early in her career, she joined a convent for a short time but felt unease with her decision: “As a good Catholic, [I was] always having guilt. . . . I thought, ‘How do I get out of here?’. . . . So I started flicking through all these theology books and I ran across a chapter on temporary vocations. And I thought, ‘Aha! I had a temporary vocation.’” After leaving the convent, she took a job at IBM where she would begin an incredibly successful career. Yet Pfeiffer still felt great tension over her decision after leaving the convent: “I felt I had failed . . . wasn’t generous enough . . . didn’t love God enough . . . was too selfish. It took me a year and a half to get over that.”²¹ Nevertheless, she remained religiously active. Another federal judge, Deanell Tacha, described her faith as important to her but then added, “but [my faith] was one that I understood. I needed to separate to some extent my public life from my private life.”²² Both Tacha and Pfeiffer consider religion to be important to them, but their interviews indicate a separation of public and private life. This is quite different from many of the male respondents who indicated their religious lives complemented their professional lives. None our interviews with elite men suggest they find religion at odds with their professional lives. Yet elite women who remain religious appear to do so by separating it from their highly successful careers.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Our results call into question some prevailing notions about gender differences in religion. We have seen that some previous explanations of the religious

¹⁹Interview with Doris Meissner, October 20, 2009 (Washington, DC).

²⁰Interview with M. Margaret McKeown, October 21, 2009 (Washington, DC).

²¹Interview with Jane Cahill Pfeiffer, October 1, 2009 (Vero Beach, FL).

²²Interview with Deanell Tacha, December 16, 2009 (Kansas City, MO).

gender difference among the general population (the family and career structure hypothesis and the personality hypothesis) only partially explain why so many *elite* women consider religion unimportant. Furthermore, many of the standard demographic explanations of who considers religion to be important—age, race, marital status, and number of children—do not hold.

We also see that some (but not all) forms of education affect the importance of religion for elite women, but certain forms are especially salient. A woman with a graduate degree from a university—an experience where the student focuses on a particular field or subfield—is more likely to consider religion unimportant, but a woman who sees the White House Fellowship—a program specifically designed to broaden her knowledge base—as important to her development is much less likely to view religion as unimportant. Education can be a conduit, then, for both greater and lesser religious awareness and interest.

In addition, we find that career focus, public prominence, and markers of status all significantly affect an elite woman's religious life (addressing the social-status hypothesis). While our cross-sectional data cannot show us the reason for these effects, we suggest the possibility that elite women are caught in a double-bind in which they must choose whether to reflect the religious norms among women in the general population or to reflect what they perceive to be prevailing norms among elites. Risk-aversion theories have been used to explain why women are more religious than men among the general population (Collett and Lizardo 2009; Miller and Hoffmann 1995; Miller and Stark 2002; Stark 2002). Since women still make up only a small portion of society's upper echelon (Domhoff 2006; Moore 1998), elite women may feel it is less risky for religion to be *unimportant* in their lives among fellow elites.

Given the gendered religious landscape, how do aspiring elite women navigate the relationship between faith and professional life? We know from other works that elite aspirants are socialized into the dominant ideology of elite culture (Bourdieu 1984; Lareau 2003). We think that some of the dynamics at work in elite educational, social, and workplace settings may also be at work in their religious lives.

In their analysis of the increasing diversity among the American elite, Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (2006) describe the struggles that women may face in reaching the higher strata of society and show how women may experience pressure to assimilate to the existing culture of elite ranks: "Women who make it into the corporate elite must assimilate sufficiently into the predominantly male culture to make it into the comfort zone. . . . Women in the corporate world are expected to be competitive and tough-minded, but not too competitive or tough-minded, or they risk being called ball-busters" (56). For example, one woman found that the atmosphere was considerably more welcoming to her once she smoked a cigarette with the otherwise all-male board of a large corporation. Other women felt the need to play golf as a way to "fit in with the boys." Such gender-based dynamics appear to continue. President Obama played golf with Melody Barnes, his domestic policy advisor, after being criticized that his

all-male basketball games and high-profile inner circle of men were unfairly limiting the informal opportunities for interaction between the president and women in his administration (Leibovich 2009).

We similarly suggest that under the pressure to assimilate, many women seeking to fit into a primarily male culture may find that they have an easier time—or at least *think* they will—if they avoid making religion one more identity hurdle to overcome. That is, women rising into the upper echelons may reject or at least deemphasize some of the things they perceive to be feminine in order to embrace their “elite” identity. As one woman executive put it, “I heard second-hand from someone as to how I would be perceived as a pushy Jewish broad who went and got an MBA. Both elements, being Jewish and being a woman, together with having the MBA, were combined to create a stereotype. I had to work against that stereotype from the first day” (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 2006: 54).

We should also consider the larger religious mosaic and how the lack of leadership roles for women in some religious traditions may also affect the lives of religious elites. Some work has been done on the way that women respond to doctrines that officially limit their participation and, in particular, leadership opportunities (Gallagher 2004; Manning 1997). Roman Catholicism, Evangelical Protestantism, Islam, and Orthodox Judaism all espouse theologies that limit the role of women in various leadership positions. Even when no official doctrine addresses the matter, women can be limited by traditional gender roles within a religious context (Min 2008). For these reasons, we are not surprised to see that Mainline Protestantism—historically one of the most receptive groups to placing women in leadership positions (Chaves 1996)—is the most popular religious identity among the elite women studied, as seen in figure 2. Additional research is needed to determine if this trend results from greater recruitment efforts toward elite women on the part of Mainline Protestant denominations, if these denominations do a better job of retaining them, or if these denominations do a better job supporting ambitious women who ultimately reach the elite ranks.

Furthermore, we suggest that elite women may not enjoy the same benefits from religion that elite men do when they occupy senior positions, as some religious traditions do not provide similar forms of support and encouragement for elite women as for elite men. In at least some elite sectors, men’s Bible studies or fellowship groups are much more prominent than women-only analogues (Lindsay 2007). In addition, among even the general population women-only groups often meet during the day, when women who work full time are unable to attend (Edgell 2006). In the interviews with White House Fellows, we saw multiple examples of a faith-informed identity for men but no faith-oriented equivalent among the women. We surmise that the construction of a gendered identity among these elite women does not involve religious expression to the degree that we see among the men. That, coupled with religious cultures that do not support their adoption of an elite persona or of women in leadership more generally, results in their lower ratings of the importance of religion compared with those of elite men.

We recognize limitations to our study and suggest several avenues of future research. First, our data are only cross-sectional. We hope our findings will motivate further research on religion and elites that will produce compelling evidence for causal explanations. Second, our study universe is small. Larger studies will be able to draw more firm conclusions about the differences between elite men and women. We especially hope future studies of the religious lives of elites will consider religious tradition (both current and as a child) and risk aversion in greater detail, two factors we expect to be important to elite religious gender differences. Third, we lack refined measures for many of our variables. For example, we know there are gender differences between active and affective measures of religiosity (Sullins 2006), but our dependent variable is one affective measure. We hope future research can consider different types of religiosity, status, and attitudes.

We also hope this article spurs future researchers to consider status when studying religious gender differences more broadly. Rather than assuming certain religious gender differences, scholars need to engage status markers, stratification, and respondents' self-orientation to create finer-grained analyses of these differences. For example, if elite women do not benefit from religion the same way elite men do, then in the general population do women benefit from religion *more* than men do?²³

Lastly, we call for more research on gender differences among elites. How do elite women draw upon identity markers (religious or otherwise) as a way of building bridges with elite men? Also, noting that norms vary by status, are there gender differences in the potential risks of not following those norms and in the levels of risk aversion among elites? And are those different from what we expect to find in the general population? As women become "insiders" among the American elite, they face the challenge of fitting into arenas once dominated by men while at the same time maintaining their distinctive identities as women. This touches on every aspect of their lives, including, as we have shown, their relationship to the religion.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank Justin Denney, Elaine Ecklund, Conrad Hackett, Rachel Kimboro, Elizabeth Long, and Jeremy Porter for their constructive feedback. We thank Myles Bugbee, Amanda Dworak, Jon Endean, Alexandra Espinoza, Molly Goldstein, Mary Grace Hager, Omar Metwalli, Andrew Patterson, and Melissa Sheng for their help coding, cleaning, and analyzing data on the White House Fellows. We thank Jack LeCuyer, Bob Edmonds, Janet Eissenstat, and Diane Yu for their help through the President's Commission on White House Fellowships and the White House Fellows Foundation and Association in securing the required access to survey current and former fellows.

²³We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this question.

FUNDING

This study would not have been possible without the financial support of Malcolm and Joanne Turner and Vester T. Hughes, as well as grants from Rice University's Faculty Initiatives Fund, the Spencer Foundation, the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, and the Carnegie Corporation of New York. While these sponsors and colleagues have provided invaluable support and assistance, the analyses and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.

APPENDIX

TABLE A1 Odds Ratios and Standard Errors from Logistic Regression on Religion as Unimportant among All and Male White House Fellows (*Source*: White House Fellows Project, 2008)

Variable	All white house fellows	Men only
Male	0.691 (0.190) [†]	
Age	1.009 (0.011)	1.013 (0.013)
Nonwhite	0.632 (0.178)	0.549 (0.194) [†]
Elite education		
Undergraduate	1.187 (0.281)	1.467 (0.403)
Graduate	1.781 (0.448)*	1.447 (0.416)
WHF developed leadership	0.566 (0.140)*	0.728 (0.206)
Family/career		
Currently married	0.979 (0.300)	0.698 (0.269)
Number of children	0.818 (0.076)*	0.813 (0.088) [†]
Work very important	1.518 (0.379) [†]	1.316 (0.378)
Views/attitudes		
Failure is from laziness	0.881 (0.098)	0.824 (0.104)
People are trustworthy	0.990 (0.127)	1.145 (0.180)
Status/prominence		
Policy organization	1.446 (0.347)	1.283 (0.353)
Marquis Who's Who	1.381 (0.346)	1.274 (0.355)
-2 log-likelihood	494.42	373.14
Pseudo- R^2 (Nagelkerke)	0.069	0.071
N	423	328

[†] $p < .10$; * $p < .05$ (two-tailed).

REFERENCES

- Argue, Amy, David R. Johnson, and Lynn K. White. 1999. "Age and Religiosity: Evidence from a Three-Wave Panel Analysis." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 38, no. 3:423–35.
- Argyle, Michael, and Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi. 1975. *The Social Psychology of Religion*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Avishai, Orit. 2008. "Doing Religion' in a Secular World: Women in Conservative Religions and the Question of Agency." *Gender & Society* 22, no. 4:409–33.
- Baltzell, Digby E. 1953. "Who's Who in America' and 'The Social Register': Elite and Upper Class Indexes in Metropolitan America." In *Class, Status, and Power*, edited by Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, 266–75. New York: Free Press.
- Beit-Hallahmi, Benjamin. 1997. *The Psychology of Religious Behavior, Belief and Experience*. New York: Routledge.
- Berger, Peter, Grace Davie, and Effie Fokas. 2008. *Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and Variations*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Broad, David. 1996. "The Social Register: Directory of America's Upper Class." *Sociological Spectrum* 16, no. 2:173–81.
- Brown, Callum G. 2001. *The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation 1800–2000*. New York: Routledge.
- Chalfant, Paul, Robert Beckley, and C. Eddie Palmer. 1994. *Religion in Contemporary Society*. Itasca, IL: F.E. Peacock.
- Chatters, Linda M., Robert Joseph Taylor, and Karen D. Lincoln. 1999. "African American Religious Participation: A Multi-Sample Comparison." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 38, no. 1:132–45.
- Chaves, Mark. 1996. "Ordaining Women: The Diffusion of an Organizational Innovation." *American Journal of Sociology* 101, no. 4:840–73.
- Cheng, Simon, and Brian Powell. 2005. "Small Samples, Big Challenges: Studying Atypical Family Forms." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 67, no. 4:926–35.
- Collett, Jessica L., and Omar Lizardo. 2009. "A Power-Control Theory of Gender and Religiosity." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 48, no. 2:213–31.
- Cornwall, Marie. 1988. The Influence of Three Agents of Religious Socialization: Family, Church, Peers. In *The Religion and Family Connection*, edited by Darwin Thomas, 207–31. Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Religious Studies Center.
- De Vaus, David A., and Ian McAllister. 1987. "Gender Differences in Religion: A Test of the Structural Location Theory." *American Sociological Review* 52, no. 4:472–81.
- Domhoff, G. William. 2006. *Who Rules America? Power, Politics, and Social Change*. 5th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Dye, Thomas R., and Julie Strickland. 1982. "Women at the Top: A Note on Institutional Leadership." *Social Science Quarterly* 63, no. 2:333–41.
- Ecklund, Elaine Howard. 2005. "Different Identity Accounts for Catholic Women." *Review of Religious Research* 47, no. 2:135–49.
- . 2010. *Science vs. Religion: What Scientists Really Think*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ecklund, Elaine Howard, and Elizabeth Long. 2011. "Scientists and Spirituality." *Sociology of Religion* 72, no. 3:253–74.
- Edgell, Penny. 2006. *Religion and Family in a Changing Society*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Series in Cultural Sociology.

- Ellison, Chris G., and Darren. E. Sherkat. 1990. "Patterns of Religious Mobility among Black Americans." *Sociological Quarterly* 31:551–68.
- Feingold, Alan. 1994. "Gender Differences in Personality: A Meta-Analysis." *Psychological Bulletin* 116, no. 3:429–56.
- Freese, Jeremy. 2004. "Risk Preferences and Gender Differences in Religiousness: Evidence from the World Values Survey." *Review of Religious Research* 46, no. 1:88–91.
- Gallagher, Sally K. 2004. "The Marginalization of Evangelical Feminism." *Sociology of Religion* 65, no. 3:215–37.
- Ghiloni, Beth Wesley. 1987. "The Velvet Ghetto: Women, Power, and the Corporation." In *Power Elites and Organizations*, edited by G. William Domhoff, and Thomas R. Dye. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1973. *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies*. London: Hutchinson.
- Hoge, Dean R., and David A. Roozen. 1979. "Research on Factors Influencing Church Commitment." In *Understanding Church Growth and Decline 1950–1978*, edited by Dean R. Hoge and David A. Roozen, 42–68. New York: The Pilgrim Press.
- Hout, Michael, and Andrew Greeley. 1987. "The Center Doesn't Hold: Church Attendance in the United States, 1940–1984." *American Sociological Review* 52, no. 3:325–45.
- Iannaccone, Laurence R. 1990. "Religious Practice: A Human Capital Approach." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 29, no. 3:297–314.
- Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. 1977. *Men and Women of the Corporation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Lareau, Annette. 2003. *Unequal Childhoods: Class, Race, and Family Life*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lawless, Jennifer, and Richard Fox. 2005. *It Takes a Candidate: Why Women Don't Run for Office*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Leibovich, Mark. 2009. "Man's World at White House? No Harm, No Foul, Aides Say." *New York Times* October 24.
- Levitt, Mairi. 1995. "Sexual Identity and Religious Socialization." *British Journal of Sociology* 46, no. 3:529–36.
- Lindsay, D. Michael. 2007. *Faith in the Halls of Power: How Evangelicals Joined the American Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Manning, Christel J. 1997. "Women in a Divided Church: Liberal and Conservative Catholic Women Negotiate Changing Gender Roles." *Sociology of Religion* 58, no. 4:275–90.
- . 1999. *God Gave Us the Right: Conservative Catholic, Evangelical Protestant, and Orthodox Jewish Women Grapple with Feminism*. Piscataway: Rutgers University Press.
- Martin, Janet M. 1989. "The Recruitment of Women to Cabinet and Subcabinet Posts." *Western Political Quarterly* 42, no. 1:161–72.
- Miller, Alan S., and John P. Hoffman. 1995. "Risk and Religion: An Explanation of Gender Differences in Religiosity." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 34, no. 1:63–75.
- Miller, Alan S., and Rodney Stark. 2002. "Gender and Religiousness: Can Socialization Explanations Be Saved?" *American Journal of Sociology* 107, no. 6:1399–423.
- Mills, C. Wright. 1956. *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Min, Pyong Gap. 2008. "Severe Underrepresentation of Women in Church Leadership in the Korean Immigrant Community in the United States." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 47, no. 2:225–41.
- Moore, Gwen. 1979. "The Structure of a National Elite Network." *American Sociological Review* 44, no. 5:673–92.
- . 1988. "Women in Elite Positions: Insiders or Outsiders?" *Sociological Forum* 3, no. 4:566–85.
- Nadell, Pamela S. 2009. "Rabbis in the United States." In *Jewish Women: A Comprehensive Historical Encyclopedia*. Jewish women's archive. Retrieved March 22, 2010. <http://jwa.org/encyclopedia/article/rabbis-in-united-states>.

- O'Toole, Patricia. 1995. *White House Fellows: A Sense of Involvement, A Vision of Greatness*. Washington, DC: White House Fellows Foundation.
- Petts, Richard J. 2007. "Religious Participation, Religious Affiliation, and Engagement with Children among Fathers Experiencing the Birth of a New Child." *Journal of Family Issues* 28, no. 9:1139–61.
- Pew Research Center. 2011. *Is College Worth It? College Presidents, Public Assess Value, Quality and Mission of Higher Education*. Washington, DC: Pew Social & Demographic Trends.
- Purvis, Sally B. 1995. *The Stained-Glass Ceiling: Churches and Their Women Pastors*. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press.
- Putnam, Robert D. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Read, Jen'nan Ghazal, and John P. Bartkowski. 2000. "To Veil or Not To Veil? A Case Study of Identity Negotiation among Muslim Women Living in Austin, Texas." *Gender & Society* 14, no. 2:395–417.
- Roth, Benita. 2004. *Separate Roads to Feminism Black, Chicana, and White Feminist Movements in America's Second Wave*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sherkat, Darren E. 2002. "Sexuality and Religious Commitment in the United States: An Empirical Examination." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 41, no. 2:313–23.
- Sherkat, Darren E., and Christopher G. Ellison. 1999. "Recent Developments and Current Controversies in the Sociology of Religion." *Annual Review of Sociology* 25:363–94.
- Scott, John. 2008. "Modes of Power and the Re-Conceptualization of Elites." *Sociological Review* 56:27–43.
- Shiels, Richard D. 1981. "The Feminization of American Congregationalism, 1730–1835." *American Quarterly*, 33, no. 1:46–62.
- Smith, Christian. 2008. "Future Directions in the Sociology of Religion." *Social Forces* 86, no. 4:1561–90.
- Stark, Rodney. 2002. "Physiology and Faith: Addressing the "Universal" Gender Difference in Religious Commitment." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 41, no. 3:495–507.
- Steensland, Brian, Jerry Z. Park, Mark D. Regnerus, Lynn D. Robinson, W. Bradford Wilcox, and Robert D. Woodberry. 2000. "The Measure of American Religion: Toward Improving the State of the Art." *Social Forces* 79, no. 1:291–318.
- Stocks, Janet. 1997. "To Stay or Leave? Organizational Legitimacy in the Struggle for Change among Evangelical Feminists." In *Contemporary American Religion: An Ethnographic Reader*, edited by Nancy L. Eiesland, 99–120. Walnut Creek: Alta Mira Press.
- Sullins, D. Paul. 2006. "Gender and Religion: Deconstructing Universality, Constructing Complexity." *American Journal of Sociology* 112, no. 3:838–80.
- Suziedelis, Antanas, and Raymond H. Potvin. 1981. "Sex Differences in Factors Affecting Religiousness among Catholic Adolescents." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 20, no. 1:38–51.
- Turco, Catherine J. 2010. "Cultural Foundations of Tokenism: Evidence from the Leveraged Buyout Industry." *American Sociological Review* 75, no. 6:894–913.
- Walter, Tony. 1990. "Why Are Most Churchgoers Women? A Literature Review." *Vox Evangelica* 20:73–90.
- Walter, Tony, and Grace Davie. 1998. "The Religiosity of Women in the Modern West." *British Journal of Sociology* 49, no. 4:640–60.
- Wuthnow, Robert. 2007. *After the Baby Boomers: How Twenty- and Thirty-Somethings Are Shaping the Future of American Religion*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Zuckerman, Harriet. 1972. "Interviewing an Ultra-Elite." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36, no. 2:159–75.
- Zweigenhaft, Richard L., and G. William Domhoff. 2006. *Diversity in the Power Elite: How It Happened, Why It Matters*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.